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Abstract 
 
Twenty years after the Revolution in 1979, Iran is gradually opening up to the West. 
However, the country is still rather un enigma to most Westerners, who tend to think of the 
country in clichés, if not outright caricatures. Especially as far as management is concerned 
our knowledge is very limited. In this paper we aim at filling part of that gap by presenting 
the results of an exploratory study of management culture in Iran. The study is based on 
interviews, observations, and literature. After having set the scene in terms of the environing 
society, we will treat the following topics: Authority relations, personal networks, 
interpersonal behaviour, women in business, and bargaining. In conclusion we will tentatively 
put forward some recommendations for managers and decision-makers wanting to approach 
the Iranian market, and we will discuss the scope of our findings and the possible directions 
for future research in the area. 
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Breaking out of isolation 
 
The Revolution in Iran in 1978-79, brought Muslim Fundamentalists to power under the 
leadership of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. They took over power from Shah Reza Pahlavi 
(1941-1979), thereby turning the country into an Islamic Republic, a theocracy. Twenty odd 
years later, new winds are blowing over the country. The new and somewhat milder winds are 
represented by the reformist Mohamad Khatami, himself a cleric, who was carried to the 
presidency by general elections in May 1997, and reelected in June 2001 with an 
overwhelming majority of seventy and eighty per cent of the electorate respectively. In the 
l990s, after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, Iran has made efforts to break out of the 
country’s international isolation by improving relations with its neighbouring countries in the 
Persian Gulf and the Middle East as well as with the US and the European community (The 
Economist Intelligence Unit 1999:5). A testimony of the profound change in attitude since the 
US Embassy hostage crisis in 1979 is the reaction of President Khatami the very night of the 
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tragedy of 11th September 2001, in which he expressed his profound sympathy with the 
American people and his wish for the world to unite in the fight against terrorism (Le Monde 
15/09/2001). For Teheran Washington is no longer the big Satan. In 2001, Iran has even 
applied for membership of the World Trade Organisation. 
 
The general response from the international community seems to be an appreciation of Iran’s 
efforts to break the isolation. We may therefore expect an increase in trade relations and 
cooperation with this potential market of some 65 million people, of which two thirds are less 
than 25 years old (L’Express 28/01/1999). 
 
However, the country is still rather un enigma to most Westerners, who tend to think of the 
country in clichés, if not outright caricatures. Previous research on Iran in the field of 
management is limited:. Monir Tayeb (1979) studied cultural aspects of Iranian organisations. 
A more recent study examined paternalistic leadership and job satisfaction in Iran (Mortazavi 
& Saheli 1992), and Kiani & Latifi have examined Iranian management in the light of a 
multi-faceted culture perspective (1997). Moghadam studied workers’ councils in Iran in the 
light of industrialization strategy and in a historical perspective (1988). Other sources found 
are limited to comments in cross-cultural studies, where many countries are involved, the 
most important being that of  Hofstede (Hofstede 1991). 
 
The aim of this article is to try and fill in part of the gap by presenting the results of an 
exploratory study of contemporary management practice in Iran. The study is based on 
interviews with eight persons from five companies, five managing directors and three 
employees, on observations, and on literature on Iranian management and related areas such 
as Arab and Islamic influence on Iranian management culture, the Revolution, religion, and 
women in business. Results indicate differences between Arab/Islamic and Iranian 
management cultures in terms of a more moderate power distance in Iran. At the interpersonal 
level, the importance attached to loyalty to superior was also found somewhat more moderate 
in Iran. On the other hand, a paternalistic attitude was registered in terms of employees 
expecting superiors to help solve their private and financial problems. Personal networks 
were found to be extremely important and so was attention paid to rank and status and 
politeness, especially verbal politeness, tarof. Bargaining was found to be an integral part of 
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any business deal, even the most insignificant ones in terms of the amount at stake. Contrary 
to expectations by many Westerners, a foreigner may feel most welcome in business circles 
among the very hospitable, friendly and open-minded Iranians, in whom the anti-West and 
anti-US politics are not reflected (Faradonbeh 2000, The Economist 1997). 
 
The article will lead on a brief description of the Iranian society to-day. It will then move to a 
number of relevant themes such as authority relations, the importance of networks through 
family relations and other personal connections, interpersonal behaviour seen in politeness 
and hospitality, women in business, and bargaining. In conclusion we tentatively put forward 
some recommendations for managers and other decision-makers wanting to approach the 
Iranian market. Finally, we will discuss the scope and limitations of our findings and the 
possible directions for future research in the area. 
 
Iranian management to-day is interesting firstly because the country is slowly opening up to 
the West after two decades of ignorance on the part of Westerners as to sides of life in Iran 
other than the political and religious aspects. Up till quite recently, the political discourse was 
dominated by the belligerent official language and images of mobs demonstrating in the 
streets against “the devils in the West”. Now after twenty years of austere clerical regime, the 
reform movement is gradually gaining momentum, especially among young people who have 
not known life before the Revolution.  Secondly Iranian management is interesting because 
most people in the West confound Iranians with Arabs, believing that what they learn about 
Arab countries is also valid for Iran, and this obviously is a misunderstanding. Thirdly, it is 
interesting because the regime is now eager to attract direct foreign investment 
(Weekendavisen 4-10/12/1998, Le Monde 15/09/2001) to help develop industry and 
commerce. Finally, Iran is still one of the major oil producing and oil exporting countries and 
as such in a strategic position in relation to a still more oil thirsty West. 
 
The data 
 
The empirical data are based on an interview study in Iran in 1999 collected over a period of 
six weeks. Data are based on qualitative, in-depth, semi-structured interviews. The 
respondents were four managing directors, a production manager and three employees from 
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five companies, all production companies, small to medium sized (i.e. 1-99, 100-499 
employees), situated in Teheran or big provincial towns; all are shareholding companies, 
mostly family owned. Most interviews were tape recorded, either conducted in English or 
interpreted from Farsi/Iranian and content analysed by themes. The objective was to elicit 
what Western/Scandinavian managers and business people should know about Iranian 
management culture in order to obtain the best possible starting point for communicating and 
dealing with Iranian companies and managers. The implicit comparison is consequently 
Scandinavian culture. 
 
Apart from the interview data, this article will draw on evidence and contributions from a 
number of other sources in Danish, English, French, and Norwegian to supplement and 
discuss the empirical findings. 
 
 
Iranian Society to-day 
 
Iran is huge in territorial size with an area as large as Germany, France, the UK, and Spain 
together (Danish Foreign Ministry 1995:13). However, most of the area is arid land, deserts, 
mountains and plains with sparse vegetation, exploited by herds of sheep. The climate is 
continental with hot summers with temperatures rising to almost 50 degrees Celsius in the 
south along the Persian Gulf and cold and snowy winters in the North and East parts of the 
country, an exception being the narrow strip of coast along the Caspian See in the North, 
where the climate is subtropical. The population is estimated to be about 65 millions (Danish 
Embassy, Teheran, 1998:4), of which two thirds are less than 25 years old (L’Express 
28/1/99:55). 61 percent of the population live in cities and 39 percent in rural areas (figures 
from 1996-97). 
 
The labour force can roughly be divided by sectors as follows (figures from 1996): 
Agriculture 24 per cent, manufacturing, mining, construction and public utilities 28 percent, 
services and other sectors 48 percent.  Official unemployment figures for 1997 was about 12.5 
percent (DUP 1999:24), unofficially estimated to be much higher. The labour force is not well 
organised, and independent trade unions of any importance are non-existent (Faradonbeh 
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2000). 
 
The Iranian economy relies heavily on the oil and gaz industry, which accounts for well over 
80 percent of its export earnings, in 1998 12.8 billion US$ and 40-50 percent of the state 
income. In 1998 GDP was 1,770 US$/capita (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affaires 1999). The 
exports constituted about 20 percent of GDP. Some 86 percent of Iran’s GDP still comes from 
government-owned businesses (The Economist 1997:13). The main trading partners are 
Japan, Italy, South Korea, and France for exports, and Germany, Japan, Italy, and the United 
Kingdom for imports.  Inflation has been high for several years and was estimated to be 
around 20 percent for both 1998 and 1999. (Markedsprofil Iran, 1998, and Iran 1999-2000, 
The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1999). Corruption is common, especially in dealings with 
public institutions (Faradonbeh 2000). 
 
Politics 
As already mentioned, Iran is an Islamic republic, which means a state with a formulated 
Islamic constitution and an Islamic legal system in which clerics will officiate as judges. At 
the same time it is a republic organised as a democracy, two seemingly incongruent 
principles. The present spiritual leader is ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei, and president is 
hojastoleslam Seyed Mohamad Khatami. 
 
In the 1979 Revolution, the Shah - and with him a 2,500 year old monarchy - was deposed, 
and the clergy undertook the governing of the country. A new constitution was formed and 
adopted and changes were to take place in ‘all civil, penal, financial, economic, 
administrative, cultural, military, political, and other laws and regulations to be based on 
islamic criteria’ (Amuzegar 1993:26). The laws passed by the Majles, the Iranian Parliament, 
were to be compatible with the Shariah, the islamic law and Velayat-e Faqih, the Islamic 
jurisprudence. This last mentioned institution was given immense powers such as the task of 
appointing the highest judicial authorities, the task of judging the suitability of presidential 
candidates, and lastly it became the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Next in power 
after the office of the Velayat-e Faqih is that of the presidency (Economist Intelligence Unit 
1999:6). 
A number of other political institutions and power bases were formed: 
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The Islamic Republican Party. In contrast to typical Western models of political parties, 
which normally have  common leadership, programme and political platforms, this party has a 
variety of platforms, groups and factions, so that it defies specific categorisation. According 
to Vakili-Zad (in Bina & Zangeneh 1992:32) the clergy’s differences and conflicts of opinion 
are most often based on associations, connections, and relations to non-clerical interest groups 
and personal preferences rather than on ideology. 
 
The Assembly of Experts is a 73 member council that has the functions of a) reviewing, 
amending and redrafting the constitution, b) selecting the leader (which may be either one 
sole faqih or a Council of faqihs), and c) holding the right to impeach and remove the Leader 
(Faradonbeh 2000:42). 
 
The Guardian Council with 12 members has the function of controlling that legislation is in 
accordance with Islamic law, and approving candidates who may stand for election to the 
Majles and the presidency (Faradonbeh 2000:43). Six members are appointed by the leader of 
the Velayat-e faqih and six by the Majles. 
 
The Majles is the National Assembly or Iranian parliament. As of spring 2000 it has 280 
members elected through universal suffrage. 
 
The Expediency Council has the function of mediating in disputes between the Council of 
Guardians and the Majles. (Faradonbeh 2000:42-43). 
 
Political parties were forbidden in 1985, but legalised again in 1998 (The Economist 
Intelligence Unit 1999:7). Their scope of activities are restricted since they must be formed 
and operate within the frames set by the constitution, which aims at conformity rather than 
diversity. 
 
Apart from these formal institutions, two other groups should be mentioned, since they 
constitute important power bases in society and in the political system: One is the ulema, 
experts in religious law and theological matters. It generally enjoys great respect in society. 
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Wilson (1997:145) thus states that  
 
For many in Iran it is the Ayatollahs, Mullahs and other members of the Ulema, the 
religious scholars, who are the most highly respected members of society. Business 
leaders and even government and lay members of the Majles, the Iranian parliament, 
do not command the same respect. The authority of the religious leadership comes 
from their knowledge of the Koran and the holy writings, and their ability to interpret 
the Shariah religious laws. 
 
The other powerful group is the Bazaari, members of the Bazaar trading community, largely 
 conservative and religious entrepreneurs (Husain 199:233), which has no direct equivalent in 
any part of the Western world. It has existed and been an important societal entity since long 
before the existence of Islam (Encyclopaedia Iranica, 1989, vol. 4:30). Traditionally, the 
Bazar embraces the largest part of the commercial sectors, trade networks, and financial 
networks (Mozzafari 1998:103). 
 
From the beginning of the Islamic era, the religious community and the Bazaaris have been 
interdependent, since the bazaar was not only a place for exchanging commodities, but also a 
place where religious norms and cultural values could be discussed and exchanged. In 
contemporary Iran it is both a socio-economic power base of the Shi’ite religious 
establishment and a bastion of political protest movements (Encyclopaedia Iranica 1989, vol. 
4, p. 30). During the Shah reign they were in strong opposition to the modernisation and 
westernisation of the Iranian society for both economic and cultural reasons.  Economically 
because the import of Western goods by state-purchasing corporations and the modern retail 
trade in the form of government subsidised supermarkets (Husain 1995:233) threatened their 
traditional goods and ways of trading, and because their tradition for providing loans was 
endangered by modern style banks. Culturally they were guardians of traditional values and 
therefore disgusted by Western values and people’s disrespect for Islam (Hvidt et al. 
1989:44). The bazaaris played an active role in the uprising against the Shah and in the 
Revolution, helping to organise it and being the major financial supporter (Hvidt et al. 
1989:44.). 
 
The Bazaaris and the Ulema are interdependent, economically, culturally and personally, the 
Bazaaris supporting the ulema financially, and the Ulema often providing an interpretation of 
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Islam, which conforms with the interests of the Bazaar (Mozaffari 1991) and finally by 
personal relationships due to extensive matrimonial bonds between the two groups (Mozzafari 
1998:106). After the establishment of the Islamic Republic, the Bazaar has managed to 
enforce its role in society and has made efforts to become part of the new regime (Mozzafari 
1991:385). Still according to Mozzaffari  
 
“... the ethical norms and rules of the bazaar have acquired the status of norms and 
ethics for the society as a whole. Thus the ethics of the Bazaar have provided an 
ethic of refuge and anchoring point for national identity in periods of social crisis. In 
this sense the bazaar is a kind of memory of the people of Iran” (1991:379). 
 
For this reason, eyes turn towards the Bazar when there is a crisis, every time something basic 
to society - the collective self - is being sought, and every time society seeks a mirror to 
reflect its image (Mozzafari 1998:104). 
 
Democracy in Iran ? 
 
An interesting question at this point is to what extent we may consider Iran a democratic 
society. On the one hand members of the Majles are elected in general universal and direct 
suffrage and so is the President of the Republic. Additionally, in the spring of 1999 for the 
first time in the history of the country, general elections were held for local representative 
bodies, an important decentralisation of the Islamic state. This is quite extraordinary and 
exceptional for an islamic society. The result was another overwhelming 70 percent victory 
for the reform movement, in so much as the reformists are now in majority in 13 out of 15 
cities, among others the capital city of Teheran and the largest provincial town Isfahan 
(Weekendavisen 12-18 March 1999). In February 2000, a new and more reform oriented 
parliament was elected. 
 
On the other hand, candidates presenting themselves for election to the Majles and the 
presidency have to be approved by the Guardian Council, which is consequently higher in 
power than both of these institutions. Then again, out of the 12 members of the Guardian 
Council 6 are chosen by the Majles and 6 by the leader of the Velayat-e Faqih, the islamic 
jurisprudence, the latter therefore being above them all and the ultimate centre of power. 
However, contrary to what happens in many other Muslim countries, once candidates have 
been approved, the election is left to take its course, and the results seem not to be falsified or 
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tampered with (Andersen and Seeberg 1999:26). 
 
It is also important to note that women have the right to vote and what more is are eligible 
alongside men. The Iranian women are ascribed a major role for the election of president 
Khatami and for the overwhelming success of his party the Islamic Front.  The parliamentary 
elections of 2000, ensured about 70 percent of the seats for the Khatami supporters in the 
Majles. However, although Khatami has strongly encouraged women to take part in politics 
and in social matters, the women themselves represent only 3.8 percent of the Majles 
Assembly, a decrease from 7 percent in the former assembly (Berlingske Tidende 14/7/2000), 
one reason being that it is very difficult for women to be approved by the Guardian Council to 
be candidates for elections. 
 
In conclusion, it is a system of parallel and intertwined powers, and the question of whether 
Iran can be said to be a democratic society is open to interpretation, but it does seem to be 
moving towards more democracy. 
 
Language 
The main language in Iran is Farsi, which belongs to the Indo-European family of languages; 
it is not an Arab tongue. However, due to the close cultural and religious ties to the Arab 
world from the introduction of Islam to the old kingdom of Persia, a considerable amount of 
vocabulary and expressions has been imported from Arabic. The structure of the language is 
similar to German, and relatively easy to learn for North Europeans. However, the scripture is 
based on the Arabic alphabet and consequently constitutes a certain barrier. 
 
Religion 
The majority of Iranians belong to the Shia branch of Islam, which represents only about 15 
percent of the world community of Muslims. This fact places the Iranians in opposition to 
most of their neighbours in the region, which belong to the Sunni branch. The differences 
between the two groups go back centuries and was a schism over the succession of the 
Prophet Muhammad. The Shi’ah Muslims believe that the Prophet nominated Ali to be the 
first caliph or imam of the Muslim community and reject the legitimacy of the three first 
caliphs that preceded Ali. In addition, Sunnis insist that Prophet Muhammad was illiterate and 
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a mere human being through whom God revealed his message (as recorded in the Koran), 
while Shi’ahs contend that the Prophet was literate, infallible, and possessed semi-divine 
attributes (Husain 1995:7). 
 
A third major difference is in the area of islamic jurisprudence, which is not central to this 
article and consequently not further developed. 
 
These differences in belief have been an obstacle to the reconciliation of the two branches and 
played a major role in the eight years war between Iraq and Iran in the 1980s, since both sides 
could claim that the other party in the conflict were not true believers. 
 
Contrary to most other great religions, Islam integrate spiritual and profane life, which means 
that religion has its say in all areas of everyday life such as politics, martial law, 
jurisprudence, food, clothing, and etiquette, and contract law also including business life. 
 
We will now turn to management in Iranian companies. 
 
Authority Relations 
 
When looking at Iranian management culture, the issue of authority relations is interesting. 
Our study has revealed practices similar to the Arab top-down authority, yet a more moderate 
management culture, seen from a Western (especially North Western) point of view. 
 
First, Iranian management clearly contains elements of top-down authority. Interviews with 
both managers and common workers clearly gave the impression that authority runs top down 
in Iranian organisations. Most decisions of importance were usually made by superiors. This 
does not mean, however, that no delegation whatsoever was seen, only that common workers 
were left out of the decision making process. They seemed rather surprised by even being 
asked about decision making, since in their opinion they had no influence on decision-making 
at all. 
 
In line with this is the fact that disbelief in workers in the McGregor sense of the word 
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(Theory X) was observed. In different contexts managers revealed a perception of the 
common workers as lazy, as lacking a proper working moral, as always trying to work as little 
as possible and as often making disputes and arguments, thus thwarting efficient work. 
 
On the other hand, authority seems less strongly centralised in the Iranian companies 
compared to the Arab/Islamic world as such, where, according to sources, all decision making 
authority is held by one superior, so that there is hardly any delegation, neither to the middle 
levels of management, nor to common workers, or even foremen. As a result, all decisions are 
pushed upwards and top managers have to take care of even small and trivial matters (Wright 
in Hickson, 1997). 
 
In Iranian companies, the top-down authority was found to be more moderate. Although most 
authority seems to be held by the top managers, there was still some degree of delegation of 
authority and decision-making power to lower levels of management. All the managers 
explained that formal organisation charts were being used, and they could all easily draw 
detailed charts showing several hierarchical layers. They stressed the importance of the 
hierarchy and emphasised that small decisions were supposed to be solved further down the 
organisation.  General observations and discussions confirmed these results. 
 
Illustrative, in this context, is Hofstede’s description of high power distance cultures, where 
an unequal power relationship between managers and workers is accepted and expected by 
both parties (Hofstede, 1991, 2000). In Hofstede’s power distance index Iran scores 
noticeably higher than many Western, and especially North Western countries (eg the US, 
Germany, Scandinavia), but considerably lower than some Arab countries (Iran 58/Arab 
countries 80) (Hofstede 2001:87). 
 
Despite this fact, both interviews and general observations showed that paternalism is 
common in Iran. The workers as well as employees expected superiors to help solve both 
financial problems, such as in the case of wedding expenses, purchasing of new homes, 
illness in the family, education of employees’ children, as well as private problems, such as 
marital conflicts. Our findings also indicated that superiors clearly considered it their 
responsibility to help solve both the financial and the private problems of the employees.  All 
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the superiors had special funds or budgets for covering such financial difficulties of the 
employees. And regarding private matters, they would occasionally interfere on the private 
arena, making efforts to solve the employees’ family disputes such as in the case of marital 
conflicts. 
 
In sum, regarding the issue of authority relations, top-down authority was registered, though 
in a more moderate shape than in the Arab/Islamic world. Still, paternalistic behaviour was 
found in all the companies. 
 
Family Relations and Personal Connections 
 
One does not need to know a lot of Iranians, or to spend much time in Iran, to realise that the 
family plays a different and more extended role than it does to most Westerners, especially 
the North Europeans.  Results show that this orientation has an influence also on the business 
context. 
 
In contrast to many parts of the Western world, where the individual is in focus, there is in 
Iran a stronger orientation towards the family. Among relatives there is a perceived 
interdependence, both emotionally and financially, and marriage between relatives is still 
frequent. In this respect there is a difference between rural and urban areas, the rural being 
very traditional and the families in the big cities becoming more split up, with young married 
couples moving out to live on their own. Still, it seems that the family plays a fundamental 
role to the individual. When Iranians meet with friends they have not seen for some time, for 
instance, one of the most common topics is to speak about friends and relatives, in the sense 
which family did so-and-so marry into and less whom did the person marry. Muna, who has 
made a study of Arab executives, also discusses this issue. His conclusions point to the fact 
that when Arabs meet their countrymen for the first time, they usually attempt to establish 
each other’s family identity. In the West, on the other hand, the initial conversation revolves 
around a person’s occupation or profession (Muna, 1980). The examples indicate a stronger 
family orientation in the Middle East. 
 
The extended family constitutes the core of the social network of the Iranians and this 
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network is extremely important both in society in general, and in a business context in 
particular. For almost any practical task or personal problems one needs solved, it is done 
through personal connections and informal channels. Formal systems, official institutions and 
procedures are less efficient, statistics and registers are less available and considered less 
reliable, and the law system is perceived as complex and unreliable (Faradonbeh, 2000). 
Therefore, informal channels are preferred and needed. 
 
The custom of working through informal channels was experienced in the effort to arrange 
interviews with Iranian executives. Making similar arrangements in a Western (especially 
North European) context, can fairly easily be done by writing a letter or making phone calls to 
any company and ask for interviews, independent of relatives and personal connections. 
 
Iranian relatives or our guides in Iran explained thoroughly that this was not done in Iran. 
Instead they phoned other relatives or friends, who had other connections and so on. In other 
words, informal channels were needed. 
 
Through a system of exchanging favours through informal channels, Iranians are used to and 
willing to do each other favours to an extent far beyond what is common among most 
Westerners. During our field work, for instance, we had trouble finding translators. Finally, 
two persons were found through connections.  They travelled from another city and took 
several days off from work in order to help out. We were advised to give neither money nor 
presents, only to remember that we owed them a favour in return. This a typical way of 
establishing and maintaining long-term networks.  
 
In this respect, Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner’s framework of understanding managerial 
behaviour in different cultures is helpful. One of their dimensions concerns universalistic 
versus particularist behaviour (Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1999). Universalist 
behaviour is rule based, implying that people falling under a rule should be treated alike, and 
exceptions should be avoided. With particularist behaviour, on the other hand, friends and 
relatives are regarded as more important than rules and laws.  It is under this category that 
Iranians belong: our findings show that anything will be done to help a friend or relative, and 
examples are numerous. If for instance you are being stopped for speeding, you get a fine, but 
 
 
14 
if the police officer happens to be an acquaintance of the family, you may get a reduction, 
depending on the strength of the friendship.  
 
The same seems to apply in a business context. The use of informal channels is dominant, and 
by playing  parti bazi, rules may always be bent or twisted. Parti bazi implies that positions 
and advantages that one is not formally entitled to can be obtained through personal 
connections. Conversations with Iranians have revealed numerous examples of how one can 
get far in obtaining positions and advantages by speaking to, becoming friendly with and 
ingratiating oneself with certain influential persons. And what is interesting is that there is no 
obvious negative attitude towards this phenomenon, it is just the way it works. 
 
All these results pointing at the importance of family and personal connections in a business 
context may be seen in the perspective of Hofstede’s description of collectivist societies. 
Iranian management culture clearly contain more collectivist elements than many of the North 
European cultures (Hofstede, 1991, 2000).  Then one might ask what about trust and loyalty, 
which, according to Hofstede is of such fundamental importance in collectivist societies? Our 
study indicates that loyalty plays an important role in Iran, considerably more so than in many 
Western countries (e.g. the US, Germany, Scandinavia), but apparently less so than in most 
Arab countries, since in the case of  recruitment for a position, qualifications are also highly 
emphasized, so that formal qualifications or lack thereof is not outweighed by loyalty. This 
can be seen as a logical consequence of the high level of education obtained in Iran since the 
Revolution in 1979. 
 
As a consequence of this extended use of connections, Iranians always seem open towards 
new connections and acquaintances. At the same time ‘old’ connections are kept and 
maintained, even though they are not ‘being used’. One example illustrating this is that during 
the two week long celebration of the Iranian New Year, not only closest family, but also 
distant family, friends and business relations visit and revisit each other. Part of this is to 
maintain and nurse the relations and connections. 
 
This connection-orientated attitude and way of solving all tasks both in general and in a 
business context is extremely important to be aware of for foreigners wanting to do business 
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in Iran. A network has to be both developed and nursed. Especially North Europeans should 
be aware that spending time building personal relations is fundamental. 
 
Politeness and hospitality 
 
The other side of the same coin is that of politeness and hospitality, which, in Iran, equals that 
of Arab countries. They are obvious phenomena in some ways, yet subtle and hard to fully 
comprehend by Westerners in others. 
 
Anyone travelling to Iran will notice the polite and hospitable behaviour and manners of all 
Iranians. Not only countrymen, but also foreigners are met with a welcoming and hospitable 
attitude. One expression of this is the kind of verbal politeness called ‘tarof’, which can to a 
certain extent be considered almost ritual, since it connotes well behaved politeness and 
respect that is not meant to be interpreted literally. 
 
One of our first experiences with ‘tarof’ was in connection with interviewing the informants 
in the companies, to which we were always accompanied by a contact, the person introducing 
us. In the customary Iranian fashion, several of the interviewees invited us home for dinner 
with the family. Our contact systematically refused to accept the invitation, but the invitation 
would be repeated and refused several times during the visit. It was ‘tarof’ behaviour, which 
is frequently used towards friends, colleagues, acquaintances and business relations. 
However, had we accepted the invitation, the family would feel honoured, and a lavish dinner 
would have been prepared for hours, making sure that food would be plentiful. The person 
being invited will accept or refuse the offer depending on several factors, among others how 
well they know the other part, the circumstances, and whether he will be able to reciprocate 
the invitation in some way. This is not meant as a recommendation to refuse all invitations, 
only to try to sense whether the other part is making ‘tarof’ or not. 
 
The tendency is that the less the hosts know their guests, or the more respect they want to 
show, the more ‘tarof’ is being made. Also when addressing a person the tendency is to add 
honorifics and niceties’ depending on the respect the speaker wants to show. 
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Tarof behaviour is part of Iranian high context communication (Hall & Hall 1990), in as 
much as there is a lot more information in a tarof conversation than what is explicitly said. It 
takes a thorough knowledge of the culture to be able to correctly interpret the nuances 
according to the situation.  
 
Westerners, and among them especially Scandinavians, who are not much used to implicit 
language, might need to consult with other Iranians in order to better understand the messages 
conveyed. 
 
Bargaining 
 
Whereas doing business always means trying to negotiate the best deal in terms of price and 
related conditions anywhere in the world, this does not normally in the Western world extend 
to everyday little purchases. 
 
In Iran, however, like in the entire Middle East and North Africa, buying small items or more 
extended deals often involve the process of bargaining. It is a game that all participates in and 
that all seem to delight in as part of the pleasures of life. Customers may walk into a shop; 
start looking around with a dissatisfied expression in their face. Then they may start 
complaining about the products and asking the staff or the sales person whether he, or the 
shop, really does not have any better quality. If the customer finds something of interest, he 
will then start, after a while, to discuss the price. The price is not necessarily set from the 
beginning. Even if there are price tags on the products, it may be just a starting point for the 
bargaining. It is very common to bargain before agreeing on a price. Towards the closing of 
the deal, Iranians may be discussing insignificant amounts of money, but still the bargaining 
goes on. Price tags on products are now seen more frequently though, and one does not 
always negotiate the price, especially not in more modern shops or supermarkets in big cities.  
 
The bargaining represents a tradition that goes back thousands of years, and which has been 
maintained by the Bazaris. According to this tradition the choice of dealer or business relation 
is an important one. Iranians choose their business partners first and foremost from a 
consideration of trust, since the societal structures are such that they do not offer protection in 
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case something goes wrong. Although there is a body of law one can refer to, the execution of 
the law is unpredictable and depends on the subjective interpretation of the persons one deals 
with in the official system (Faradonbeh 2000:107). Consequently, a person that you can trust 
is a better insurance against mishaps than relying on the official system. 
 
According to Wilson (1985:19), the tradition is also that you bargain with your usual supplier. 
The Western custom of shopping around for the best price and the best conditions is not well 
accepted. The obvious reason is that it breaks with the golden rule of trust. It takes time to 
build up a relationship based on trust, and so you need to have a long-term strategy and a lot 
of patience.  
 
The next question is how does one know whom to trust ? The typical way is to get introduced 
to someone recommended to you by someone that you already feel that you can trust, i.e. 
building on relationships and connections. A foreigner, who does not have such connections 
should contact his country=s local embassy or representative for assistance. 
 
Women in society and business 
 
As already mentioned women have the right to vote and they are eligible alongside men. 
 
According to the constitution of 1979, women also have the right to work and to study, and 
they certainly make use of this right, in as much as 57 percent of all university students were 
females in 2000 (Berlingske Tidende 4/08/2001). On this background, the traditional image in 
the West of Islam being entirely repressive towards women cannot be confirmed. In Iran at 
least they enjoy a status that many a woman in Afghanistan or Saudi Arabia might envy them. 
It is not Islam as a creed that is repressive, but the cultural traditions developed, sometimes as 
a result of interpretations of the holy scriptures. 
 
Examples of women careers in Iran would include a female vice-president in the first Khatami 
government (Andersen and Seeberg 1999:28), and a female diplomat  now representing Iran 
in the United Nations in New York (L’Express 28/1/99).  The manager of Tehran University 
is a woman, who is also member of Parliament; however, she is one out of only 11 women 
 
 
18 
members (less than 4 percent of total) (Berlingske Tidende 14/07/2000). In 1997, four women 
registered to run for the presidency and so did two women in the 2001 election. In 1998, nine 
women tried to stand for the Assembly of Experts. In these elections all the women were 
rejected by the Council of Guardians (Wright 2000:136). But women are on the move: almost 
one third of government employees were females in 1999. More than three hundred women 
won in Iran’s first local elections in 1999. Growing numbers of  Iranian women have become 
lawyers, doctors, professors, newspaper and magazine editors, engineers, business executives, 
economists and television newscasters. In 1998, more than a third of university faculties were 
female (Wright 2000:137). And probably most surprising to many Westerners is the fact that 
in the ancient holy city of Qom, the Zahra Society is educating women who aspire to be 
ayatollahs (Wright 2000:154). 
 
The Islamic world has a centuries long tradition of female business women, going back to 
pre-islamic times, since the Prophet Muhamad’s first wife, Khadidja, was a wealthy merchant. 
Commerce has always been held in high esteem, and women are by no means excluded from 
doing business. Iran is no exception, and examples of women running their own businesses 
are numerous. In the Islamic world, women even have an advantage compared to their sisters 
in the West, in as much as what they gain they may keep to themselves. They do not have to 
share their earnings with their husband, who is supposed to be sole supporter of the family. 
 
All these examples need to be set in perspective, however; they cannot and should not be 
taken to imply that the fight for equality of women in Iran is all over. The general spirit is still 
phallocratic and misogynist compared to most Western countries. 
 
Just as Iranian women may hold offices and conduct business, so may Western women, and 
there is nothing to prevent them doing so, on condition that they do not violate islamic codes 
of conduct. This entails being properly dressed, which means covering arms, legs and neck, 
and preferably wearing loose clothes that do not disclose body figure, but nobody expects 
foreign women to wear the chador; a head-scarf and a coat are compulsory for out-door 
purposes though.  The code of conduct also entails never to be in secluded rooms for 
negotiations or talks with men including never to take people to your hotel room.  The point is 
to prove to the surroundings that nothing indecent is going on. 
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Since it is still normally taken for granted that a man would be in charge, female business 
persons and female negotiators are recommended not to bring male subordinates, so as to 
prevent having to stress who is in authority. 
 
Conclusions and recommendations 
 
This paper set out to fill part of the gap in our knowledge about contemporary management in 
Iran. We have done so by using an exploratory study of management culture in Iran and 
supplementing with existing literature. We can conclude that Iranian management has 
similarities with other countries in the Arab/Islamic world, but regarding authority relations 
more moderate seen from a Western point of view. It seems to be less centralised, some 
delegation being practised though not as far down as workers’ level. Paternalism is common, 
employees and workers expecting their superior to help out in case of financial as well as 
private matters. Special funds were set aside in the companies for such purposes. 
 
It was clear that family relations and personal connections are extremely important for getting 
things done in the business context as well as in matters involving public authorities. This 
means that there is a complicated system of doing each other favours and owing favours in 
return. People will go a long way to help out even distant relatives and friends of friends, 
simply because systems that we rely on in the West do not exist or are not reliable.  It is 
important to note also that no negative attitude was registered in this connection. This is just 
how things are. 
 
As in other countries in the Middle East, loyalty plays an important role, but apparently less 
so in Iran, since in the case of  recruitment for a position formal qualifications are at least 
equally important. 
 
In many respects Iranian women enjoy a better status than in other Islamic countries. 
They have the right to vote and they are eligible alongside men. The new constitution also 
give them the right to work and study, and in urban areas they massively make use of those 
rights. They can hold public offices in national and local administrations and have civil jobs 
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in all professions, some are even studying to become ayatollahs. There is a long tradition of 
women conducting business, and they may even keep their gains to themselves, not being 
obliged to share their income with their husband. 
 
In view of what has been stated above, recommendations for Western business people, be 
they male or female, would be to be prepared to use long time to build up relationships and to 
keep on nursing them and staying in contact. Inside the companies, Westerners should be 
prepared for the paternalistic attitude of employees and workers expecting superiors to help 
out in private and financial matters. Some delegation of authority can be practised, but control 
mechanisms should be tight. 
 
Western companies and organisations can safely send women representatives to Iran to 
conduct business and take part in negotiations, provided the women respect Muslim codes of 
conduct. We strongly recommend that the women representatives are not accompanied by 
subordinate males, or that it is made absolutely clear to the Iranian counterpart who is in 
charge. 
 
 
Concepts defined 
 
Islamic Republic: A republic with a formulated Islamic constitution and an Islamic legal 
system in which clerics will officiate as judges over criminal cases and punish offenders 
according to Shariah law (Husain 1995:233). Note that business cases are not part of criminal 
law. 
 
Majles: The Iranian parliament. It has 280 members elected through universal suffrage. 
 
Modernist Muslim: Devout to very devout; eclectic; not rigid or puritanical. Significantly 
influenced by non-Islamic (especially Western) ideas, ideals, and practices.  Though they may 
come from the ranks of the Ulema, the majority have been non clerics. Very particular about 
placing all adopted popular and beneficial non-Islamic/foreign concepts, practices, and 
institutions within islamic framework. (Husain 1995:152). 
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Muslim fundamentalists: Extremely devout and austere and often puritanical. Minor influence 
of some non-Islamic (e.g. Western) ideas, ideals, and practices. Not exclusively from the 
ranks of the Ulema, many non clerics among them. Look primarily to classical period of 
Islam for inspiration and emulation; secondary emphasis on medieval Islamic era. Extremely 
opposed to modern secular (especially Western or Socialist) ideas, practices, and institutions 
that are contrary to Islam. (Husain 1995:152) 
 
Parti bazi: implies that positions and advantages that one is not formally entitled to can be 
obtained through personal connections. This phenomenon has no negative connotations to 
Iranians. 
 
Paternalism: Authoritarian ‘fatherliness’. When the responsibility of managers extends into 
the private lives of the employees, for instance when it is expected that managers should help 
solve personal problems and financial difficulties of the employees and their families. 
 
Reformist: A person who wish to introduce reforms in order to modernise the society, for 
instance. so as to introduce the general principles of a state of law, to allow political parties 
and to conduct a socially oriented economic policy (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
1999). 
 
Shariah: The comprehensive, eternal, immutable, and sacred body of canon law governing the 
individual and community life of Muslims (Husain 1995:6). 
 
Shi’ah Muslims: The minority sect comprising 15 percent of the World’s Muslims. They 
believe that Prophet Muhammad nominated Ali to be the first caliph or imam, thereby 
rejecting the legitimacy of  the first three successors, revered by the Sunnis. The Shi’ahs also 
contend that the Prophet was literate, infallible, and possessed semi-divine attributes. (From 
Husain 1995:7) 
 
Sunni Muslims: Make up 85 percent of the World’s Muslims. The Sunnis revere the first three 
caliphs that the Shi’ahs reject. In addition, Sunnis insist that Prophet Muhammad was 
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illiterate and a mere human being through whom God revealed his message (from Husain 
1995:7). 
 
Tarof: An aspect of polite behaviour of Iranians implying that things are said in order to be 
polite and show respect. These expressions are not meant to be interpreted literally. 
Depending on the situation, people will know when tarof is being made (Faradonbeh 2000). 
 
Ulema: Islamic experts in religious law and theological matters. 
 
Velayat-e faqih: The experts in Islamic jurisprudence. 
 
Zakat: The fourth pillar of Islam. It enjoins Muslims to donate 2.5 percent of their wealth in 
alms to the needy or to a charitable institution (Husain 1995:7). 
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